Saint Louis University Law Journal
Volume 62
Number 1 The Sanford E. Sarasohn Conference
on Critical Issues in Comparative and
International Taxation II: Taxation and Migration
(Fall 2017)

Article 3

2017

Migrants and Refugees: A EU Perspective on Upholding Human
Rights Through Taxation and Public Finance
Cristina Trenta
Cristina.Trenta@oru.se

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Cristina Trenta, Migrants and Refugees: A EU Perspective on Upholding Human Rights Through Taxation
and Public Finance, 62 St. Louis U. L.J. (2017).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol62/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more
information, please contact Susie Lee.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES: A EU PERSPECTIVE ON
UPHOLDING HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH TAXATION AND
PUBLIC FINANCE

CRISTINA TRENTA*
INTRODUCTION
The European Union (“EU”) proclaimed the year 2015 as the year for
development. 1 The EU is working hard to enhance development within Europe
and within developing countries. 2 Development is currently one of the focus
areas at the European and at the international level. 3 In the EU Joint Declaration
on Consensus on Development, the EU Parliament lists a series of areas of law
that affect development. 4 Immigration law is an important topic to tackle within
development, 5 together with the provision of sustainable solutions for refugees. 6
The EU strives to make “migration a positive factor for development.” 7 The EU

* Cristina Trenta, Dr., Dr., Docent, Associate Professor, Tax law, Örebro University (Sweden). The
author is thankful to Prof. Dr. Bertil Wiman and the Uppsala Center for Tax Law, supported by
Deloitte, EY, KPMG, Mannheimer Swartling, PwC, Skeppsbron Skatt, Svalner, for their financial
assistance in the final stages of research.
1. Council Decision 472/2014, art. 1, 2014 O.J. (L 136) 1, 4 (EU) (designating 2015 as the
“European Year for Development” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
2. Development and Cooperation, EUR. UNION, https://europa.eu/european-union/topics/de
velopment-cooperation_en [https://perma.cc/G7HX-QJRP].
3. See Development Centre, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], http://www.o
ecd.org/dev/ [https://perma.cc/LNC6-XGME].
4. See generally Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments
of the Member States Meeting Within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission
on European Union Development Policy: ‘The European Consensus,’ 2006 O.J. (C 46) 1 (EU)
[hereinafter European Consensus on Development].
5. Id. at 7 (“Development is also the most effective long-term response to forced and illegal
migration and trafficking of human beings.”). For a more recent statement, see Joint Statement by
the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States Meeting Within the
Council, the European Parliament and the Commission: The New European Consensus on
Development: ‘Our World, Our Dignity, Our Future,’ 2017 O.J. (C 210) 1, 4 (EU) [hereinafter
European Consensus on Development] (acknowledging that “mobility and migration” is an element
that needs to be addressed in order to achieve sustainable development).
6. European Consensus on Development, supra note 4, at 4.
7. Id. at 7.
1
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Commission supported this view in their recent document “A Global
Partnership for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development.” 8
The need to integrate migration policies into development policies has also
been suggested by the EU Commission in another document discussing the
development-migration nexus and maintaining that refugees and other migrants
can result in positive assets for the national economies. 9
The interconnections between migrants, refugees, 10 and development is an
area of intervention and research which is very well explored in doctrine: the
same cannot be said unfortunately of the links these factors have to tax law and
public finance, 11 even though systematic investigations of this interplay is
attracting considerable European and international attention in the specific field
of tax law.
This Paper aims to provide an initial survey of the problems that connect
taxation and public finance to current migration and refugee policies. It then
discusses the existing EU obligations in the light of both European and
international regulations and constraints in the area and concludes by illustrating
the role taxation could play in supporting solutions to the refugee and migrant
crisis that are respectful of the principles adopted by the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights, 12 with the goal of providing benchmarks for further
analysis and an initial platform for possible improvements in the light of future
reforms.

8. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A Global
Partnership for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development after 2015, at 14, COM (2015)
44 final (Feb. 5, 2015).
9. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Maximising the
Development Impact of Migration, at 3, COM (2013) 292 final (May 21, 2013) (explaining how
refugees can benefit economies through human capital, labor skills, and creating demand for goods
and services).
10. Refugees are persons escaping from armed conflict or persecution. See United Nations
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1(A)(2), July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 152
(entered into force Apr. 22, 1954) [hereinafter Refugee Convention]. The protection of refugees
includes the guarantee of different human rights. Conversely, migrants decide to move not because
of a direct threat of persecution or death. See UNHCR Viewpoint: ‘Refugee’ or ‘Migrant’ – Which
Is Right?, U.N. REFUGEES AGENCY (July 11, 2016), http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/7/55df
0e556/unhcr-viewpoint-refugee-migrant-right.html [https://perma.cc/UCA6-B9K2?type=image].
11. For the link between tax law and development, see generally Communication from the
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social
Committee: Tax and Development, Cooperating with Developing Countries on Promoting Good
Governance in Tax Matters, COM (2010) 163 final (Apr. 21, 2010).
12. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 391, 395 (EU)
[hereinafter EU Charter] (noting that the EU is “based on the principles of democracy and the rule
of law”).
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I. THE EU COMMITMENT TO UPHOLDING HUMAN RIGHTS

Concerns for social justice are nowadays strongly intertwined with concerns
about immigration flows. The migrant and refugee phenomenon currently
experienced in Europe is alarming because of the unpreparedness of both the EU
and the individual EU Member States in dealing with the massive social and
governance issues that the unrelenting inflow of people presents. 13
In 2015, one million individuals entered the EU creating an unprecedented
humanitarian crisis with enormous political repercussions. 14 The EU
Commission recognized that, albeit reactions were timely, they fell collectively
short of managing the situation, leading to the recent set up of the Agenda on
Migration of the EU. 15 It has been estimated that currently more than sixty
million people have been coercively pushed out of their countries because of
conflicts or natural disasters. 16
The EU certainly is committed to upholding human rights. The Lisbon
Treaty 17 considers human rights and the people’s well-being a core value for the
EU, as proclaimed in Article 2 of the Treaty of the European Union (“TEU”). 18
The respect of human rights not only governs EU internal activities, but also all
EU external actions. 19 Specifically, EU external policies concerned with
development cooperation 20 have to be respectful of human dignity, freedom,
democracy, equality, and the rule of law. 21 The European Court of Justice
(“ECJ”) upheld this correspondence between human rights and development in
European Parliament v. Commission of the European Communities. 22

13. Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons, EUR. COMM’N (June 19, 2017), http://ec.euro
pa.eu/echo/refugee-crisis_en [https://perma.cc/MRW8-9FVJ].
14. Migrant Crisis: One Million Enter Europe in 2015, BBC NEWS (Dec. 22, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35158769 [https://perma.cc/7EK5-7HHW].
15. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A European Agenda
on Migration, at 2, COM (2015) 240 final (May 13, 2005).
16. EUR. CIVIL PROT. & HUMANITARIAN AID OPERATIONS, EUR. COMM’N, FORCED
DISPLACEMENT: REFUGEES, ASYLUM-SEEKERS AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE (IDPs) 2
(2017), http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/thematic/refugees_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/23VQ-KSKM].
17. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing
the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 (EU) [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon].
18. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 2, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C
326) 13, 17 (EU) [hereinafter TEU].
19. Id. art. 21, at 28–29.
20. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 208(1),
Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47, 141 [hereinafter TFEU].
21. Sergio Carrera, Daniel Gros & Elspeth Guild, What Priorities for the New European
Agenda on Migration?, CEPS COMMENT., Apr. 22, 2015, at 1, https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/
MigrationPriorities.pdf [https://perma.cc/K4C2-XCV3].
22. Case C-403/05, Parliament v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. I-9070, ¶ 57.
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Additionally, Articles 18 and 19 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights
assure the rights of asylum and also protect people subjected to removal,
expulsion or extradition in the event that a serious risk exists that these people
would face a death penalty, torture, or any other inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment. 23 The EU Member states are also signing parties in the Refugee
Convention, thus accepting to provide international protection to people
escaping from persecution or serious harm. 24 The Convention also grants
refugees, among other rights, the rights to work, education, housing, and access
to the judicial system. 25
EU Member States can violate human rights under the protection of the EU
Charter in times of humanitarian crisis if those rights are in fact ineffective. 26
Breach may occur if the discussed area of law falls under the scope of application
of the EU Charter, and if a Member State’s inaction violates the rights of asylum
seekers. 27 Infringements of the EU Charter’s provisions may occur when EU
Member States implement or fail to implement EU law. 28 It is worth stressing
that after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU Charter has become
a binding instrument. 29
II. THE FINANCIAL BURDEN OF THE IMMIGRATION INFLOW

Amidst this humanitarian crisis, the EU and its Member States are finding
out they cannot protect human rights if there are not sufficient public finance
and taxation funds specifically devoted to sustaining this effort, nor if there are
no adequate institutional structures prepared to cope and manage such states of
emergency. This way, the letter of the law becomes a stranglehold: costs
associated with the refugee inflow and the related duties states have to fulfill are

23. EU Charter arts. 18, 19, supra note 12, at 399.
24. Acceptance of Selected UN Conventions, EUR. UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RTS.,
http://fra.europa.eu/en/publications-and-resources/data-and-maps/int-obligations/un [https://per
ma.cc/JNN3-M34S].
25. Refugee Convention arts. 16–17, 21–22, supra note 10, at 164, 166, 168 (recognizing
“access to courts,” “wage-earning employment,” “housing,” and “public education” as rights).
26. See VICTORIA METCALFE-HOUGH, OVERSEAS DEV. INST., THE MIGRATION CRISIS?
FACTS, CHALLENGES AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 4 (2015), https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/
files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9913.pdf [https://perma.cc/V9RY-7NJR] (explaining
the challenges facing Member States due to the scale of the crisis and the financial costs associated
with housing, education, health, and other welfare sources).
27. See Simas Grigonis, EU in the Face of Migrant Crisis: Reasons for Ineffective Human
Rights Protection, 2 INT’L COMP. JURIS. 93, 96 (2016) (“[D]uring the migrant crisis most of the
actions that allegedly infringed the rights of asylum seekers were performed by the Member States.
It was the Member States that . . . prevented [asylum seekers] from entering their respective
territories [and] did not provide sufficient information or ensure due process for their rights
defense.”).
28. EU Charter art. 51, supra note 12, at 406.
29. Grigonis, supra note 27, at 96.
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obligations, 30 not options 31 or acts of charity, 32 but the political and social costs
connected to substantial public resources being redirected and spent are proving
too onerous. 33
All the same, EU principles, intents, and statutes are conflicting with the
costs that Europe and EU Member States sustain to manage the unfolding crisis.
Protecting and upholding human rights 34 is proving a difficult proposition
requiring vast public finance expenditures and constant deployment of more
resources, 35 both nationally and at the community level:
[A] refugee can . . . be properly processed, housed, and fed, and given medical
care at the cost of 35 percent of the host country’s per capita GDP. . . . For EU
member states, this would give us an average fiscal cost per refugee and year of
roughly €10,000. For 3.5 million refugees, this would come to €35 billion per
year. . . . In fiscal terms, accepting 3.5 million refugees into the EU should not
be a problem, if it is properly managed. Still, given the limits on the EU’s budget
and the political difficulties of reform – raising €70 billion from the existing
budget would probably require an overhaul of the Common Agricultural Policy
. . . it would be unrealistic to hope to mobilise resources of this magnitude
merely by shifting funds around. It may also be unrealistic to get this amount in
additional transfers from national budgets to the EU, given that budgets are
already strained. 36

30. See Giovanni Sartor, Fundamental Legal Concepts: A Formal and Teleological
Characterization, 14 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 101, 120 (2006) (“If one wants to achieve
the conditioned legal result . . . one must bear the cost . . . of realizing the additional condition.”).
31. SERENA BRUGNOLA, INST. OF EUR. DEMOCRATS, ARE REFUGEES THE REAL THREAT TO
EUROPEAN IDENTITY? 20 (2016), https://www.iedonline.eu/download/2016/schengen/BRUGNO
LA.pdf?m=1466518861 [https://perma.cc/59FV-LSA8].
32. URBAN JONSSON, HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMING 20–21
(2003) (“Decisions and actions must be taken in recognition that every human being is a subject of
human rights, not an object of charity or benevolence.”); see also CEMAL KARAKAS, ECONOMIC
CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS OF THE REFUGEE INFLUX 2 (Eur. Parliament Research Serv.,
Briefing No. PE 572.809, Dec. 2015), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/
572809/EPRS_BRI(2015)572809_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/X6V8-T5E2] (“In the long term . . .
the refugee influx might be positive for the European economy.”).
33. SEBASTIAN DULLIEN, EUR. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, PAYING THE PRICE: THE
COST OF EUROPE’S REFUGEE CRISIS 2 (2016), http://www.ecfr.eu/page//ECFR_168_PAYING_
THE_PRICE_-_THE_COST_OF_EUROPES_REFUGEE_CRISIS.pdf [https://perma.cc/HUL6W6QJ] (mentioning the differences in the economic sustainability of refugee inflows across the EU
Member States).
34. See WOLFGANG OBENLAND, TAXES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (Tax Justice Network Ger.,
Policy Brief No. 08e, Feb. 2013), http://www.rightingfinance.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/02/
Read-full-document.pdf [https://perma.cc/3495-BMTF] (recognizing that “protecting and ensuring
human rights” is among the “most important obligations of governments”).
35. See STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY
DEPENDS ON TAXES 97 (1999) (“Rights will regularly be curtailed when available resources dry up
. . . .”).
36. DULLIEN, supra note 33, at 10–11.
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Rejection of refugees may be an alternative for EU Member States, but it
too may impose a financial burden and related monetary costs as well. The EU
Commission has presented a first set of legislative proposals to reform the
Common European Asylum System and create “a fairer, more efficient, and
more sustainable system for allocating asylum applications among [EU]
Member States.” 37 According to the proposal, a EU Member State may have the
option to reject a refugee. 38 In that case, the EU Member State would need to
pay a financial solidarity contribution of €250,000 for each applicant for whom
it would otherwise have been responsible under the fairness mechanism of
distribution of refugees. 39 Very clearly, both alternatives carry an economic
burden; consequently, public finance or taxation measures need to be
investigated to assure resources are available that can cover the costs of refugees
and the guaranteeing of their human rights. 40
III. THE ROLE OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC FINANCE

The recent EU Commission’s preparatory works stress the link between
taxation and migration. 41 In the 2016 preparatory work “Forced Displacement
and Development,” the EU Commission emphasizes the double role tax law and
public finance play in such scenarios. 42 Public spending allows the creation of
public services for displaced persons, but it can also be used as a tool to ease the
process. 43
In a more recent document, “Proposal for a New European Consensus on
Development,” the EU Commission has reaffirmed its continuous commitment
in respect to migration, while at the same time paying particular attention to tax

37. European Commission Press Release IP/16/1620, Towards a Sustainable and Fair
Common European Asylum System (May 4, 2016).
38. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing
the Criteria and Mechanisms for Determining the Member State Responsible for Examining an
Application for International Protection Lodged in One of the Member States by a Third-Country
National or a Stateless Person (Recast), at 10, COM (2016) 270 final (May 5, 2016).
39. Id. at 19.
40. See JACOB FUNK KIRKEGAARD, TOWARD A EUROPEAN MIGRATION AND MOBILITY
UNION 1–2, 6–8 (Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ., Policy Brief No. PB15-23, Dec. 2015),
https://piie.com/publications/pb/pb15-23.pdf [https://perma.cc/UWF6-ZEAH] (investigating new
funding sources).
41. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Lives in Dignity:
from Aid-Dependence to Self-Reliance, Forced Displacement and Development, at 15, COM
(2016) 234 final (Apr. 26, 2016) (“[T]he financial burden on the host country from hosting refugees
could also be achieved through tax revenues.”).
42. Id. at 15–17.
43. Id. at 15 (“Public spending creates public services for displaced persons, and it can be used
as a tool to ease the integration process.”).
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law and its role in fostering development. 44 In this light, taxation seems to be
able to play a substantial role and help increase the visibility of the EU efforts
in this area and increase awareness within EU Member States, following in the
footsteps of other fundamental rights which are individually named and funded
through taxation, such as healthcare or education.
In the EU framework, taxes are public revenue and contributions for general
community, social, and economic policies. 45 Non-fiscal or extra-fiscal interests
come in when we approach taxes from the point of view of their goals and in
terms of economic or social policing. 46 Taxes work toward cooperation and
solidarity: they are not the only tools that the public operators have at their
disposal, of course, but they are rather effective when pursuing redistributive,
allocative, and social policies that foster growth and development. From this
perspective, taxes are perceived and evaluated more in ethical terms as
promoting social welfare and as distributive justice. 47 This is a view shared by
the Lima Declaration on Tax Justice and Human Rights: 48 this nonbinding
document maintains that tax revenue is the most crucial tool to provide resources
to support, protect, and uphold human rights in “sufficient, equitable, and
accountable ways.” 49
International obligations for contracting states also exist in respect to
collecting financial resources to make the upholding of human rights more
effective. This is what the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”)50 prescribes in Article 2(1), concerning the duty for
contracting states to collect revenue in order to secure and make effective human
rights as contained in the international instrument. 51 The link among tax and
44. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Region: Proposal for a New
European Consensus on Development, Our World, Our Dignity, Our Future, at 25, COM (2016)
740 final (Nov. 22, 2016) (stressing that particular attention should be given to combating tax
avoidance).
45. CÉCILE REMEUR, TAX POLICY IN THE EU: ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 1 (Eur.
Parliamentary Research Serv., In-Depth Analysis No. PE 549.001, Feb. 2015).
46. See José Marcos Domingues, Biofuels, Megacities, and Green Taxes: The Whys and
Wherefores of Non-Fiscal Fuel Taxation. Brazil in World Context, in 7 CRITICAL ISSUES IN
ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 283, 288 (Kurt
Deketelaere et al. eds., 2009); Joachim Englisch & Henning Tappe, The Federal Republic of
Germany, in TAX ASPECTS OF FISCAL FEDERALISM: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 273, 320
(Gianluigi Bizioli & Claudio Sacchetto eds., 2011) (“[T]ax laws may also pursue extra-fiscal policy
objectives.”).
47. RICHARD W. TRESCH, PUBLIC FINANCE: A NORMATIVE THEORY 173 (3d ed. 2015).
48. LIMA DECLARATION ON TAX JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHT ¶ 1 (2015).
49. Id. ¶ 2.
50. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3.
51. Id. at art. 2(1) (“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps,
individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and
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fiscal policy, revenue raising and expenditures of Article 2(1) of the ICESCR,
and human rights has been recently acknowledged by the United Nations. U.N.
Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, Magdalena
Sepúlveda Carmona, submitted her report concerning the impact of fiscal and
tax policy on human rights at the 26th Session of the U.N. Human Rights
Council in June 2014. 52 The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights maintain that while guaranteeing these rights is a
matter of international law, national states are de facto carrying responsibility
for their effective upholding. 53 Violations of human rights generated by substandard public financing shift the responsibility of any deriving social and fiscal
injustice to the individual state. 54
IV. INVESTIGATING OPTIONS

A.

Taxation of Refugees and Limits from International and EU Law

Proposals based on shifting the burden of taxation onto refugees have been
suggested to render states less attractive to migrants and refugees. 55 These
consider refugees liable to taxation simply on the basis of entering the country,
with an income tax applied in the territory of the hosting state. The application
of such a tax would result in an income tax roughly comparable to what they
would pay in the country they fled. The reasoning is that the tax would consent
to introduce a barrier that would help differentiate between refugees and those
who falsely claim that status.
Tax law doctrine supports this approach. Domestic and customary
international law do not prevent a country from applying a worse tax treatment
to foreigners, and therefore refugees, subjecting them to protectionist taxation
measures in the host country. 56 Such a solution would not formally conflict with

technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the
full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including
particularly the adoption of legislative measures.”).
52. Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona (Special Rapporteur), Report on Extreme Poverty and
Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/28 (May 22, 2014).
53. Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ¶ 6, U.N.
Doc. E/C.12/2000/13, reprinted in 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 691, 693 (1998) (noting that states have the
obligation to protect economic, cultural, and social rights).
54. See Ignacio Saiz, Resourcing Rights: Combating Tax Injustice from a Human Rights
Perspective, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND PUBLIC FINANCE: BUDGETS AND THE PROMOTION OF
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 77, 92 (Aoife Nolan et al. eds., 2013).
55. Ryan Bubb, Michael Kremer & David I. Levin, The Economics of International Refugee
Law, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 367, 383 (2011).
56. JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 529
n.1193 (2005) (citing BRIAN J. ARNOLD, TAX DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ALIENS, NONRESIDENTS, AND FOREIGN ACTIVITIES: CANADA, AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, THE UNITED
KINGDOM, AND THE UNITED STATES 23 (1991)).
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the letter of international law on the point. Article 2(1) of the ICESCR prescribes
each state to take positive action in collecting as much of its available resources
as it can, the end goal being to fully realize economic, social, and cultural
rights. 57 On the other hand, this would go directly against another international
obligation, since the Refugee Convention, Article 29, positively maintains that:
“Contracting States shall not impose upon refugees duties, charges or taxes, of
any description whatsoever, other or higher than those which are or may be
levied on their nationals in similar situations.” 58
The references to “duties, charges or taxes” in the Refugee Convention are
included in a provision bearing the heading of “Fiscal charges” and therefore
purportedly including tax measures and “every kind of public assessment, be it
of a general nature (taxes and duties) or for specific services rendered by the
authorities to a given person (charges).” 59
The United Nations observed that the provision included in Article 29 of the
Refugee Convention was necessary, since refugees, formally stateless, are not
protected by bilateral tax treaties:
In principle foreigners residing in a country are subject to the taxes,
duties and charges to which nationals are liable. They may also be
subject to special taxes, duties and charges. A large number of bilateral
treaties concluded on the basis of reciprocity stipulate that nationals of
the contracting country shall enjoy the same treatment in fiscal matters
as nationals. Stateless persons cannot invoke these treaties. 60
Article 29 also prevents worse treatment to refugees in respect to citizens,
specifically mentioning “other” (meaning different) or “higher” taxes or
charges. 61 A refugee’s fiscal position is a very unsafe one, with an increased tax
liability and paradoxically higher risks of double taxation. Even when tax
treaties can be invoked, the possibility they do not include clauses of protection

57. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 50, at art.
2(1).
58. Refugee Convention art. 29, supra note 10, at 172.
59. HATHAWAY, supra note 56, at 530 (quoting NEHEMIAH ROBINSON, CONVENTION
RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES: ITS HISTORY, CONTENTS AND INTERPRETATION: A
COMMENTARY 148 (1953)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
60. U.N. Ad Hoc Comm. on Refugees & Stateless Persons, A Study of Statelessness, U.N.
Doc. E/1112;E/1112/Add.1, at 24 (Aug. 1, 1949).
61. HATHAWAY, supra note 56, at 531.
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against discrimination based on nationality 62 or citizenship 63 are very real, or
that reciprocity is rejected on the basis of political reasons. 64
Doctrine maintains that the fiscal equality deriving from this provision is a
formal guarantee that does not exclude the possibility for refugees to pay higher
taxes than the citizens of the host country. 65 For example, their source of income
could be subject to a different and more penalizing tax treatment than the
average source of income for citizens. 66
The obligations descending from the Refugee Convention are binding for
contracting states such as the EU Member States, 67 and are placed, according to
Article 35, under the supervision of the United Nations. 68 National authorities
are required to cooperate and facilitate U.N. supervision in respect to the
application of the Refugee Convention. 69 Then, the introduction of a tax bearing
on refugees would also be in conflict with EU law. The ECJ, in the Dimensione
Direct Sales case, explicitly states that EU law must be interpreted consistently
with international law, especially where a connection exists between the two. 70
The doctrine of consistent or uniform interpretation 71 is also in line with the
TEU, whose Article 3(5) states that the EU promotes the strict observance of

62. See OECD, Model Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital art. 24(1),
Jan. 28, 2003, http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/1914467.pdf [https://perma.cc/5426-NVYN]
(forbidding discrimination by one Contracting State against nationals of another contracting state).
63. Id. at art. 3(1)(g)(i) (defining “national,” in relation to a Contracting State, as “any
individual possessing the nationality or citizenship of that Contracting State.”). The principal rule
for the non-discrimination clause in the OECD Model Tax Convention is nationality, while the
criterion of residence is not the ground for the applicability of Article 24). See Ines Hofbauer, Tax
Treaty Interpretation in Austria, in ECOTAX, TAX TREATY INTERPRETATION 13, 20 (Michael
Lang ed., 2001).
64. HATHAWAY, supra note 56, at 527–31.
65. Id. at 531.
66. Id.
67. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 339
(“Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good
faith.”).
68. Refugee Convention art. 35, supra note 10, at 176 (“The Contracting States undertake to
co-operate with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, or any other
agency of the United Nations which may succeed it, in the exercise of its functions, and shall in
particular facilitate its duty of supervising the application of the provisions of this Convention.”).
69. See generally Monica Erasmus-Koen & Sjoerd Douma, Legal Status of the OECD
Commentaries – In Search of the Holy Grail of International Tax Law, 61 BULL. FOR INT’L TAX’N
339, 350 n.21 (2007).
70. Case C-516/13, Dimensione Direct Sales Srl, Michele Labianca v. Knoll International
SpA, ¶ 23 (May 13, 2015), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=164262&do
clang=EN [https://perma.cc/T3U6-8ZBW].
71. Jan Wouters, Jed Odermatt & Thomas Ramopoulos, Worlds Apart? Comparing the
Approaches of the European Court of Justice and the EU Legislature to International Law, in THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
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international law. 72 Nevertheless, national attempts from both non-EU and EU
Member states to introduce some form of differentiated tax burden for migrants
and refugees are not so farfetched. In 1995, the federal government of Canada
introduced a 975 Canadian dollar fee to every adult refugee and immigrant for
the right of landing. 73 In 2000, refugees were exempted, and as of 2006,
immigrants pay a reduced fee. 74 The tax has been widely criticized in that its
flat-rate nature does not respect the principle of ability-to-pay for newcomers,
hurts immigrants from poorer countries more, and is not tied to any provision of
services. 75 Additional perplexities are associated with it being in possible breach
of the Refugee Convention, whose Article 34 regulates naturalization and
prescribes contracting states to facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of
refugees, specifically indicating how charges and costs may be an obstacle to
the process: “They shall in particular make every effort to expedite
naturalization proceedings and to reduce as far as possible the charges and costs
of such proceedings.” 76
Europe is not exempt from similar experiences. Under the Single Permit
Directive, 77 EU law allows Member States to charge fees for issuing permits. 78
The fee has to be “proportionate and may be based on the services actually
provided for the processing of applications and the issuance of permits.” 79
249, 249 (Marise Cremona & Anne Thies eds., 2013) (stating that the ECJ “has interpreted EU law
in light of international law”).
72. TEU art. 3(5), supra note 18, at 17.
In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values
and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace,
security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among
peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in
particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of
international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.
Id.
73. Fees: Right of Permanent Residence Fee (RPRF) - R303, Background, GOV’T CAN. (Feb.
24, 2017), http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/tools/fees/imm/rprf.asp [https://perma.cc/WQ
4V-K6A5].
74. ANDREW BROUWER, CALEDON INST. OF SOC. POL’Y, PROTECTION WITH A PRICE TAG:
THE HEAD TAX FOR REFUGEES AND THEIR FAMILIES MUST GO 2–3 (June 1999), http://www.cale
doninst.org/Publications/PDF/headtax.pdf [https://perma.cc/VBR6-LARC]; GOV’T CAN., supra
note 73.
75. THE HEAD TAX AND ITS EARLY HISTORY, THE GETTING LANDED PROJECT,
https://www.cpj.ca/files/docs/headtax_kit_no_cover1.pdf [https://perma.cc/653K-E9FF].
76. Refugee Convention art. 34, supra note 10, at 176.
77. The Single Permit Directive regulates residence and work permits for non-EU citizens.
Directive 2011/98, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2001 on a Single
Application Procedure for a Single Permit for Third-Country Nationals to Reside and Work in the
Territory of a Member State and on a Common Set of Rights for Third-Country Workers Legally
Residing in a Member State, 2011 O.J. (L 343) 1, 1 (EU).
78. Id. art. 10, at 7.
79. Id.
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However, the Directive does not specify any ceiling. In the case of long-term
residence permits, the ECJ maintained they should be “reasonable and fair and
they must not discourage third-country nationals who satisfy the conditions laid
down by that directive from exercising the right of residence conferred on them
by that directive.” 80
This has not stopped Italy from stipulating that the issuing and renewing of
residence permits for third-country nationals who are long-term residents should
be subject to an obligatory tax and financial contribution, which is eight times
the one for obtaining a national identity card. 81 Italian law prescribes the
payment of a fee, the amount of which shall be set at a minimum of €80 and a
maximum of €200 by joint decree of the Ministry of the Economy and Finance
and of the Ministry of the Interior. 82 Exemption of payment in case of issuance
and renewal of residence permits for asylum, request for asylum, subsidiary
protection, and humanitarian reasons has only been introduced in 2009. 83 The
ECJ found Italian legislation in breach of the principles of the Single Permit
Directive, 84 mandating a disproportionate fee in the light of the objective
pursued by said Directive and liable to create an obstacle to the exercise of the
rights conferred therein. 85
B.

A EU Approach Based on the Principle of Solidarity

The EU is a “community of solidarity,” and its budget has a distinct
solidarity aim. 86 Following the Lisbon Treaty, the EU introduced Article 80 of
the TFEU, establishing “the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of
responsibility, including its financial implications” in the chapter devoted to
policies on border checks, asylum, and immigration. 87 Before Article 80, Article

80. Case C-508/10, Comm’n v. Kingdom of the Netherlands, ¶ 46 (April 26, 2012), http://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62010CJ0508&from=EN [https://perma.
cc/ZR3D-Y5CB]; see also OECD, RECRUITING IMMIGRANT WORKERS: EUROPE 2016, at 170
(2016).
81. Case C-309/14, Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL), Istituto Nazionale
Confederale Assistenza (INCA) v. Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, Ministero dell’Interno,
Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze, ¶¶ 14, 19 (Sept. 2, 2015), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:62014CJ0309&from=EN [https://perma.cc/C8HH-SHR8].
82. Decreto Legislativo 25 luglio 1998, n.286, L. Mar. 6, 1998, n.40, art. 5(2b) (It.).
83. Legge 15 luglio 2009, n.94, G.U. July 24, 2009, n.170, supplement ordinario n.128, art.
1(22)(b) (It.) (amending L. Mar. 6, 1998, n.40, art. 5(2b)).
84. Case C-309/14, ¶ 30.
85. Id. ¶ 31.
86. Financing the European Union: Commission Report on the Operation of the Own
Resources System, at 17, COM (2004) 505 final, Volume II (June 9, 2004).
87. TFEU art. 80, supra note 20, at 78; see also Paul McDonough & Evangelia (Lilian)
Tsourdi, The “Other” Greek Crisis: Asylum and EU Solidarity, 31 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 67, 74
(2012); BRUGNOLA, supra note 31, at 15. The solidarity principle has led to the approval of several
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63 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community only “promot(ed) a
balance of effort between Member States in receiving and bearing the
consequences of receiving refugees and displaced persons.” 88
In the context of the TFEU, solidarity as introduced by Article 80 means
solidarity between the EU and the Member States, with the specific aim to reach
the goals set out in the EU treaties. 89 Solidarity is also enacted through the
redistribution of public financial resources via taxation. 90
And while the EU Commission is reviewing use and results of financial
instruments in the area of immigration, 91 lack of coordination means that
emergency efforts are carried out by individual states that also adopt national
approaches to solving the matter of migrants and refugees. A good example is
the Mare Nostrum Operation, which was launched by the Italian Government in
2013, 92 solely financed via the Italian national public budget, and carried an
overall cost of nine million euros per month, or approximately 100 million euros
per annum. 93
This annual figure is negligible in respect to the EU budget and the Italian
GDP, sizing up to approximately 1/1,500th of the former and 1/15,000th of the
latter, respectively. 94 Nonetheless, the political debate around the operation was
fierce and mostly focused on how the financial burden was not shared between
EU Member States. 95

common funds. DAMIAN CHALMERS, GARETH DAVIES & GIORGIO MONTI, EUROPEAN UNION
LAW: TEXT AND MATERIALS 539 (3d ed. 2014).
88. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 63(2)(b),
Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33, 59 (EC).
89. See TFEU art. 80, supra note 20, at 78.
The policies of the Union set out in this Chapter and their implementation shall be
governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its
financial implications, between the Member States. Whenever necessary, the Union acts
adopted pursuant to this Chapter shall contain appropriate measures to give effect to this
principle.
Id.
90. DIRK VANHEULE ET AL., THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 80 TFEU, at 28 (Eur.
Parliament, Study No. PE 453.167, 2011).
91. See id. at 88.
92. Mare Nostrum Operation, MINISTERO DELLA DIFESA (It.), http://www.marina.difesa.it/E
N/operations/Pagine/MareNostrum.aspx [https://perma.cc/H79M-C5NJ].
93. The New European Operation Frontex Plus/Triton: An Operation with Differing
Objectives and More Limited Means than the Mare Nostrum Operation, EUR. ASS’N FOR DEF.
HUM. RTS., www.aedh.eu/The-new-European-operation-Frontex.html [https://perma.cc/9E9E8
TSJ].
94. EU by Topic: Budget, EUR. UNION, http://europa.eu/european-union/topics/budget_en
[https://perma.cc/R6SK-5SC7] (showing that the EU budget is 145 billion euros); Italy GDP,
TRADING ECON., http://tradingeconomics.com/italy/gdp [https://perma.cc/R99K-7F5G] (showing
that the Italian GDP was approximately 1.5 trillion euros in 2016).
95. See Carrera et al., supra note 21, at 1–2.
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V. DISCORD BETWEEN THE EU AND THE EU MEMBER STATES
The ongoing inflow of refugees in Europe is of course a primary political
concern of the Union, but widespread consensus on how to manage the related
financial burden created by the phenomenon is still to come. 96 Different
proposals considering public finance measures or taxation have been pushed
forward recently by both the EU and by individual Member States which support
the idea that the current national and European budget need to be reinforced
through the introduction of new taxes. 97 In January 2016, the European
Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs, Taxation and Customs
stated that while there is agreement that the refugee crisis requires an increase
in financial resources, the same cannot be said of how such additional resources
should be collected. 98
Solutions which have been proposed include an increase of the budget
currently allocated to refugees and migrants’ aid and management from 1% to
10% of the EU’s budget; 99 the introduction of a Schengen Fund based on
national contributions pro rata GDP, 100 especially targeting short-term costs and
one-off investments due to the migration inflow; 101 a cost-sharing fund that
would be financed by national contributions; 102 and a new tax on travel into the
EU and on visa applications for tourism or labor purposes, primarily targeting
non-EU citizens. 103

96. See Joakim Ruist, Fiscal Cost of Refugees in Europe, VOX: CEPR’S POLICY PORTAL
(Jan. 28, 2016), voxeu.org/article/fiscal-cost-refugees-europe [https://perma.cc/V283-VNXS].
Policymakers are in disagreement over how to react to the inflow of refugees because of “the
perceived financial burden that would result from larger intakes.” Id.
97. See, e.g., Eszter Zalan, Germany Proposes EU Petrol Tax to Pay for Refugees, EU
OBSERVER (Jan. 18, 2016), http://euobserver.com/migration/131876 [https://perma.cc/4C8UDY
6L].
98. See Cécile Barbière, EU Considers Petrol Tax to Pay for Refugee Crisis, EURACTIV (Jan.
19, 2016), http://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/eu-considers-petrol-tax-topay-for-refugee-crisis [https://perma.cc/3EZQ-5P5A].
99. Divert 10% of EU Budget to Refugee Crisis, Says German Minister, THEPRESSPROJECT
(May 24, 2016, 3:18 PM), http://www.thepressproject.gr/article/95189/Divert-10-of-EU-Budgetto-Refugee-Crisis-says-German-Minister [https://perma.cc/K2DY-7GL5].
100. HENRIK ENDERLEIN & NICOLE KOENIG, TOWARDS DUBLIN IV: SHARING NORMS,
RESPONSIBILITY AND COSTS 21 (Jacques Delors Institut – Berlin, Policy Paper No. 169, June 29,
2016).
101. Id.
102. Jacopo Barigazzi, Matteo Renzi Proposes European ‘Migration Bonds,’ POLITICO (Apr.
15, 2016, 10:23 PM), http://www.politico.eu/article/matteo-renzi-proposes-european-migrationbonds-donald-tusk-jean-claude-juncker-border-controls/ [https://perma.cc/48RQ-P93Y]; see
SUSANNE KRAATZ & MAGDALENA DIMOVA, LABOUR MARKET INTEGRATION OF REFUGEES; EU
FUNDING INSTRUMENTS 8 (Eur. Parliament, Briefing No. PE 570.005, Feb. 2016).
103. George Soros, Europe: A Better Plan for Refugees, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Apr. 9, 2016, 10:00
AM), www.nybooks.com/daily/2016/04/09/europe-how-pay-for-refugees/ [https://perma.cc/XDM
7-93AC?type=image].
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At the Economic and Social Affairs Council meeting on January 15, 2016,
German Finance Minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, proposed to introduce a
European petrol tax to secure expenditures to respond to the crisis and protect
the external borders of the EU, 104 with the possibility to supplement it with an
additional carbon tax on fossil fuels. 105 Such a measure would also address
environment- and development-related goals, 106 reflecting the inextricable
interplay between environmental issues and refugee management within the
larger scope of sustainable development. Schäuble’s proposal has legal standing
on the basis of the TFEU, since Article 191 and Article 192 give the Union
competence on the EU’s environmental objectives. 107 Finland’s reaction
exemplifies how fractured the EU political landscape is, with Finnish Finance
Minister, Alexander Stubb, reacting positively, even if recognizing the proposal
would be hard to implement, and Finnish Foreign Minister, Timo Soini, reacting
negatively on the grounds that a new tax remains the sovereign competence of
individual national states and not of the EU, with internal transfers of EU funds
from other areas of the budget as the preferred way to intervene. 108
CONCLUSION
The Lima Declaration on Tax Justice and Human Rights maintains that tax
revenue is the most crucial tool to provide resources to support, protect, and
uphold human rights in “sufficient, equitable and accountable ways.” 109 EU law
establishes ties between European and national tax policies 110 that, in light of
the principle of EU financial solidarity, result in inextricable links between
human rights policies and fiscal policies. The European Union acknowledges
solidarity as one of its primary drivers. This includes the sharing of all financial
burden related to asylum. All the same, EU and national-level answers in respect

104. Zalan, supra note 97.
105. ALBERTO MAJOCCHI, GROWTH, JOBS AND MIGRATIONS: THE REAL CHALLENGES 8
(Centre for Studies on Federalism, Policy Paper No. 18, June 2016).
106. Jan Corfee-Morlot & Stephanie Ockenden, Finding Synergies for Environment and
Development Finance, in OECD, DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014: MOBILISING
RESOURCES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 207, 207 (2014).
107. Guntram B. Wolff, Opinion, European Financing for the European Refugee Crisis,
BRUEGEL (May 11, 2016), http://bruegel.org/2016/05/european-financing-for-the-european-refu
gee-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/L9CC-2NW7].
108. Stubb Says EU Petrol Tax to Fund Migrant Crisis Worth Considering, Soini Says No Way,
YLE UUTISET (Jan. 17, 2016, 7:50 PM) (Fin.), https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/stubb_says_eu_pe
trol_tax_to_fund_migrant_crisis_worth_considering_soini_says_no_way/8602347 [https://perma.
cc/KZ3X-TFYT].
109. LIMA DECLARATION ON TAX JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHT ¶ 2 (2015).
110. See FLAVIA PIPERNO, MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE POLICIES OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION: TRENDS TOWARD A COSMOPOLITAN APPROACH 8 (Centro Studi di Politica
Internazionale, Policy Paper, Nov. 2014) (recognizing that policy related to human rights and the
well-being of migrants is now a “transnational issue”).
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to the use of tax measures to help solve or mitigate the migration and refugees
crisis have been inadequate and uncoordinated, with a number of ad-hoc
initiatives 111 taking the place of the concerted, proactive fiscal campaign the
circumstances would require. The consequential lack of financial resources to
properly manage the phenomenon and the absence of a single European policy
that naturally extends to tax policies places both the EU and its Member states
at risk of violating those human rights that the EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights has been instated to protect. This is extremely unsettling when
considering that because of the EU Charter and its principles, additional primary
EU legislation has been promulgated in the field of asylum and immigration.
Article 80 of the TFEU requires more than “mere cooperation” between the
EU and its Member states, 112 introducing a specific legal obligation of financial
solidarity in the field of asylum policies. The joint stipulations of the EU Charter
and the TFEU suggest that fiscal measures that support the human rights of
asylum seekers is not a matter of political debate 113 any more, but rather a EUlevel duty to ensure that the European and national systems are able to meet
human rights standards as they are protected not only under international law,
but also under primary EU law. 114
Solidarity is a EU legal principle with substantive obligations, especially if
we read it under the lens of the EU Charter on the right of asylum. The EU and
its Member States cannot afford noncompliance, especially when a humanitarian
crisis puts fundamental European values at great risk. 115 Noncompliance with
compulsory primary EU law could lead to a procedure before the ECJ for
violation of EU law, in accordance with Article 263 of the TFEU, 116 which
stipulates that any natural or legal person may bring any act addressed to them
or which is their direct and individual concern before the Court, if they are of
the opinion that such an act violates their fundamental rights as protected and
regulated by the EU. 117

111. Grigonis, supra note 27, at 94.
112. ELENI KARAGEORGIOU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF SOLIDARITY IN THE COMMON
EUROPEAN ASYLUM SYSTEM: ARTICLE 80 TFEU AND ITS ADDED VALUE 4 (SIEPS - Eur. Policy
Analysis, No. 14, Nov. 2016).
113. Philippe De Bruycker & Evangelia (Lilian) Tsourdi, Building the Common European
Asylum System Beyond Legislative Harmonisation: Practical Cooperation, Solidarity and External
Dimension in REFORMING THE COMMON EUROPEAN ASYLUM SYSTEM: THE NEW EUROPEAN
REFUGEE LAW 499 (Vincent Chetail et al. eds., 2016).
114. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Enhanced IntraEU Solidarity in the Field of Asylum: An EU Agenda for Better Responsibility-Sharing and More
Mutual Trust, at 2, Brussels, COM (2011) 835 final (Dec. 2, 2011).
115. KARAGEORGIOU, supra note 112, at 11.
116. Id. at 6 & n.39.
117. Grigonis, supra note 27, at 96.
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A major point in the querelle 118 is the fact that the EU does not have general
taxation powers. This is not expected to change in the near future. 119
Nevertheless, changes to the way taxation and public financial measures are
handled at the community level are needed if the EU wants to successfully tackle
phenomena such as the ongoing crisis, where issues of migration, refuge, human
rights, and development are tightly intertwined.
This Paper maintains that the legal basis for solidarity measures relying on
taxation would be the principle of financial solidarity as laid out in Article 80 of
the TFEU. While it can be argued that the language of the new provision in
Article 80 is unclear, 120 such lack of clarity can be dissipated by means of the
provisions in Article 18 and Article 19 of the EU Charter. Read and discussed
in context, these provisions create a much more meaningful framework that can
be used to assess the boundaries of the financial obligation to protect human
rights introduced by Article 80.
Furthermore, the joint obligations of the EU Charter and of the TFEU on the
right of asylum would suggest that it would be desirable to achieve unequivocal
agreement between the EU and its Member States on what can be done through
taxation to help respect and uphold the human rights of refugees and migrants.
Additionally, more attention should be paid to the second part of Article 80 of
the TFEU, as it gives the EU the power to adopt measures to make the principle
of financial responsibility effective. 121 There is a legal basis for solidarity
measures through taxation in the new Article 80 as supported by Article 18 and
Article 19 of the EU Charter. Further investigation is most certainly necessary,
but such a solidarity tax would not only be in line with the ongoing reforms at
the EU level, but would also positively acknowledge the international
responsibility of individual EU Member states deriving from Article 2(1) of the
ICESCR and the limits that the Refugee Convention, Article 29 and Article 34,
poses on tax measures for refugees.

118. Definition: “A quarrel about petty points.” VOCABULARY.COM, https://www.vocabulary.
com/dictionary/fr/querelle [https://perma.cc/5YKP-G5WA].
119. KIRKEGAARD, supra note 40, at 7.
120. Elspeth Guild, Administrative Law and the Common European Asylum System, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON EU ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 137, 144 (Carol Harlow et al. eds., 2017).
121. Article 80 maintains in its second part: “Whenever necessary, the Union acts adopted
pursuant to this Chapter shall contain appropriate measures to give effect to this principle.” TFEU
art. 80, supra note 20, at 78.
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